Mediation and Alternative Dispute Resolution in China
Overview of Mediation in Chinese Legal Culture
Mediation (tiaojie) occupies a central and historically deep-rooted position in the Chinese legal tradition. In Confucian philosophy, litigation was regarded as a moral failing — the ideal society resolved disputes through moral persuasion, social pressure, and the intervention of community elders, rather than through formal legal proceedings. Confucius himself declared: “In hearing litigation, I am the same as any other man. What I try to do is to make litigation unnecessary.” This cultural preference for harmony (hexie) and the avoidance of open conflict has shaped Chinese approaches to dispute resolution for more than two millennia. In the contemporary period, the Communist Party of China has maintained and adapted this tradition, promoting mediation as a mechanism for social control, the preservation of social stability, and the reduction of the burden on formal court systems. The modern Chinese mediation system comprises three principal forms: People’s Mediation (renmin tiaojie), conducted by community-based mediation committees; Judicial Mediation (fayuan tiaojie), conducted by judges within the framework of civil litigation; and Administrative Mediation (xingzheng tiaojie), conducted by government agencies. The 2010 People’s Mediation Law (Renmin Tiaojie Fa) codified and systematised the first of these, while the Civil Procedure Law and the Supreme People’s Court’s interpretations govern the second.
People’s Mediation Committees and the People’s Mediation Law (2010)
The People’s Mediation Law, effective 1 January 2011, established a comprehensive statutory framework for community-based mediation in China. People’s Mediation Committees (PMCs) are established at the village, neighbourhood, and community level, and increasingly within enterprises, schools, hospitals, and other institutions. PMCs are composed of mediators (tiaojieyuan) who are selected for their integrity, knowledge of the law, and familiarity with local conditions. The law requires that each PMC include at least one female mediator and one mediator with a background in law or social work. Mediators are not required to hold formal legal qualifications, reflecting the tradition that mediation draws on local knowledge, social authority, and practical wisdom. The PMCs operate under the guidance of the judicial administration departments (sifa xingzheng jiguan) at the county level, which provide training, supervision, and resource support. The mediation process under the People’s Mediation Law is voluntary: either party may withdraw at any time, and the mediator facilitates negotiation between the parties to reach a mutually acceptable resolution. The process is informal, without strict procedural rules, and the mediator plays an active role in proposing solutions, clarifying issues, and encouraging compromise. A mediation agreement reached through people’s mediation may apply for judicial confirmation (sifa queren) to render it enforceable through the courts, a mechanism introduced by the Civil Procedure Law and further developed by the Supreme People’s Court’s 2011 Provisions on Judicial Confirmation of People’s Mediation Agreements.
Judicial Mediation and the “Mediation First” Policy
Judicial mediation (fayuan tiaojie) is the conduct of mediation by a judge within the litigation process. The “mediation first, combination of mediation and adjudication” (tiaojie youxian, tiaojie panjie jiehe) policy, strongly promoted by the Supreme People’s Court since the early 2000s, requires that all civil cases be considered for mediation before proceeding to trial, and that judges actively encourage settlement throughout the litigation process. The SPC’s 2002 Provisions on Civil Mediation Work of the People’s Courts and its 2010 Guiding Opinion on Grand Mediation mandated the integration of mediation into all stages of civil litigation, including pre-trial, trial, and appellate proceedings. Judicial mediation may be conducted either by the trial judge or by a separately designated mediation judge or a pre-litigation mediation office. The mediated settlement agreement is recorded in a mediation judgment (tiaojie shu), which has the same binding force as a court judgment and is immediately enforceable. The mediation judgment is not subject to appeal, which gives it finality but also removes the possibility of appellate review. The rate of judicial mediation in Chinese civil cases has been extraordinarily high, with some courts reporting mediation or settlement rates exceeding 60 or even 70 percent, though these rates have declined somewhat in recent years as the SPC has cautioned against coerced mediation and emphasised the need to respect party autonomy.
The “Grand Mediation” System
The “Grand Mediation” (da tiaojie) system, promoted through the SPC’s 2010 Guiding Opinion and supported by the Central Committee of the CCP’s 2006 decision on building a socialist harmonious society, represents an ambitious effort to integrate all forms of mediation into a unified, party-state led dispute resolution framework. Under the Grand Mediation system, people’s mediation committees, judicial mediation by courts, administrative mediation by government agencies, and even party organisations’ internal dispute resolution mechanisms are coordinated under the leadership of the local party committees and government. The system is designed to create a “diversified dispute resolution mechanism” (duoyuanhua jiufen jiejue jizhi) that channels disputes into the most appropriate forum at the earliest possible stage, preventing escalation and maintaining social stability. In practice, the Grand Mediation system has been associated with the establishment of “one-stop” dispute resolution centres (yizhanshi jiufen jiejue zhongxin) at the local level, where representatives of the courts, the procuracy, the police, the justice bureau, and relevant administrative agencies work together to resolve disputes before they result in litigation. The system has been credited with reducing the caseload of courts and maintaining social stability, but it has also been criticised for putting pressure on parties to accept mediation outcomes that may not reflect their actual legal entitlements.
The Enforceability of Mediation Agreements
The legal framework for enforcing mediation agreements distinguishes between three categories of mediation. People’s mediation agreements are contractual in nature and are not directly enforceable without judicial confirmation (sifa queren). Under Article 33 of the People’s Mediation Law, the parties may jointly apply to the basic-level people’s court for judicial confirmation of the mediation agreement within 30 days of its conclusion. If the court confirms the agreement, it becomes enforceable through the court’s execution machinery; if the court finds that the agreement violates the law or the legitimate rights of the parties, it refuses confirmation, and the parties may resume their right to litigate. Judicial mediation settlements recorded in a mediation judgment (tiaojie shu) are directly enforceable and have the same legal force as a contested court judgment. Administrative mediation agreements entered into under the authority of administrative agencies may be enforceable through the administrative procedures of the agency or, in certain cases, through an application to the court for enforcement. The 2012 amendment to the Civil Procedure Law further provided for the enforcement of mediation agreements in commercial disputes with a foreign element, aligning China’s framework with international standards.
International and Commercial Mediation
China has actively promoted the use of mediation in cross-border commercial disputes. The China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) established its Mediation Centre (formerly the Beijing Conciliation Centre) in 1987, providing mediation services for international commercial disputes under the CIETAC Mediation Rules. CIETAC also operates a Joint Mediation procedure with the American Arbitration Association and other international institutions, enabling parties from different jurisdictions to resolve disputes efficiently. More recently, the China International Commercial Court (CICC) , established in 2018 under the Supreme People’s Court, incorporates mediation as a core component of its “mediation, arbitration, and litigation integrated dispute resolution mechanism” for international commercial disputes. The CICC’s International Commercial Expert Committee provides mediation services in cases involving the Belt and Road Initiative and other international commercial matters. China signed the United Nations Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation (the Singapore Convention on Mediation) on 2 August 2019, signalling its commitment to the international enforcement of mediated settlement agreements. The Convention entered into force on 12 September 2020 and provides a framework for the cross-border enforcement of mediated agreements, analogous to the New York Convention for arbitral awards.
Coerced Mediation and the Protection of Party Autonomy
The persistent problem of coerced mediation (qiangzhi tiaojie) has been a major subject of criticism within the Chinese legal system. Both empirical studies and official reports have documented instances in which judges, motivated by caseload reduction targets and performance evaluation criteria that reward high mediation rates, pressured parties to accept mediated settlements against their will. The Supreme People’s Court has acknowledged the problem: in a 2010 circular, the SPC warned that “the phenomenon of forcing mediation, persuading mediation, and excessively valuing the mediation rate still exists in some places,” and the 2012 amendment to the Civil Procedure Law introduced language emphasising that mediation must be voluntary and that courts must not compel mediation. Despite these official admonitions, the structural incentives that produce coerced mediation remain embedded in the court evaluation system, particularly the emphasis on “conclusion rate” (anjian jiejue lv) and “mediation rate” (tiaojie lv) as key performance indicators for judges. The tension between the policy of promoting mediation and the requirement of voluntariness continues to define the Chinese approach to judicial mediation. Scholars have argued that meaningful protection of party autonomy requires the removal of quantitative mediation targets from judge evaluation systems and the strengthening of appellate review for cases where mediation is alleged to have been coerced.
Mediation and the Reduction of Litigation Rates
The promotion of mediation is part of a broader strategy to manage the rapid growth of litigation in Chinese courts. Following the 1978 economic reforms and the progressive development of the legal system, the volume of civil litigation in China grew exponentially, from approximately 1.3 million cases in 1991 to over 14 million first-instance civil cases by 2019. The court system, while expanded, has struggled to keep pace with this caseload, resulting in long delays, overworked judges, and concerns about the quality of adjudication. Mediation is promoted as a means of resolving disputes outside the formal litigation process (feisu jiufen jiejue jizhi) , reducing the demand on court resources, and enabling the court system to concentrate its efforts on cases that genuinely require judicial determination. The “diversification of dispute resolution” policy, championed by the Supreme People’s Court, emphasises the importance of providing multiple pathways for dispute resolution — negotiation, mediation, administrative adjudication, arbitration, and litigation — and of directing disputes to the most appropriate channel based on their nature, complexity, and social context. The Chinese experience offers important lessons for other jurisdictions grappling with the challenges of court congestion and access to justice.