Judicial Review of Agency Action

Introduction

Judicial review of agency action is a cornerstone of American administrative law, ensuring that federal agencies act within the bounds of their delegated authority and in accordance with law. The APA provides the primary framework for judicial review, with § 706 establishing the standards of review that courts apply to agency decisions. The availability and scope of judicial review are constrained by threshold justiciability doctrines—standing, ripeness, and finality—and by the evolving law of deference to agency interpretations of law.

Finality and Reviewability

Section 704 of the APA limits judicial review to final agency action. In Bennett v. Spear (1997), the Supreme Court articulated a two-part test for finality: the action must mark the consummation of the agency’s decision-making process, and it must be one by which rights or obligations have been determined or from which legal consequences will flow. Preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency actions are not reviewable until the agency has taken final action.

The APA also creates a presumption of reviewability —agency action is presumed subject to judicial review unless a statute expressly precludes review or the action is committed to agency discretion by law. Section 701(a) codifies these exceptions, and courts construe them narrowly. In Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe (1971), the Supreme Court held that review is available unless there is “clear and convincing evidence” of congressional intent to preclude review.

Standing, Ripeness, and Exhaustion

Standing is an Article III requirement that the plaintiff have suffered a concrete, particularized injury that is fairly traceable to the challenged agency action and likely to be redressed by a favorable decision. In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife (1992), the Supreme Court emphasized that standing requires a personal stake in the outcome and that generalized grievances against government conduct do not satisfy Article III.

Ripeness prevents courts from entertaining challenges to agency action that are premature. The Supreme Court in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner (1967) articulated a two-part test: the fitness of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration. An agency action is ripe when it has a direct and immediate impact on the plaintiff’s interests and the issues are legal rather than factual.

Exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that parties complete available agency proceedings before seeking judicial review. The requirement serves the interests of agency autonomy, judicial efficiency, and factual development. Courts may waive exhaustion when the remedy is inadequate or the agency has acted beyond its jurisdiction.

Standards of Review

Section 706 of the APA codifies the standards for judicial review of agency action. The arbitrary and capricious standard applies to informal rulemaking and informal adjudication. The substantial evidence standard applies to formal adjudication and formal rulemaking, requiring that factual findings be supported by “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”

Questions of law are reviewed under varying standards depending on the nature of the issue and the legal framework governing the agency’s action. For statutory interpretations, courts traditionally deferred to reasonable agency interpretations under Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council (1984). However, in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo (2024), the Supreme Court overruled Chevron, holding that the APA requires courts to exercise independent judgment in interpreting statutes.

The Evolution of Deference Doctrines

The Chevron doctrine, established in 1984, required courts to defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutes. For forty years, Chevron governed judicial review of agency statutory interpretations, with courts applying a two-step framework that analyzed whether Congress had spoken clearly and, if not, whether the agency’s interpretation was reasonable.

The major questions doctrine emerged as a significant limitation on Chevron deference. In West Virginia v. EPA (2022), the Supreme Court held that in cases involving agency assertions of authority over matters of vast economic and political significance, the agency must point to clear congressional authorization. The Court emphasized that Congress does not delegate major policy questions to agencies in vague or ambiguous statutory language.

Skidmore deference, predating Chevron, grants agency interpretations weight based on their persuasiveness, considering the thoroughness of the agency’s reasoning, the validity of its analysis, and the consistency of its interpretation over time. Following Loper Bright, Skidmore is the applicable standard for agency statutory interpretations, requiring courts to consider agency views but to exercise independent judgment.

The Loper Bright Decision

In Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo (2024), the Supreme Court overruled Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, holding that the APA’s requirement that “reviewing courts decide all relevant questions of law” is incompatible with Chevron’s framework of mandatory deference. Chief Justice Roberts’s majority opinion reasoned that Article III courts have the constitutional duty to say what the law is and that Chevron improperly shifted interpretive authority from courts to agencies.

Loper Bright restored the traditional rule that agency interpretations are entitled to respect only to the extent they have the power to persuade. The decision does not affect Chevron deference given to pre-overruling decisions, and it maintains the validity of other deference doctrines, including deference to factual findings under the substantial evidence standard.

Conclusion

Judicial review of agency action is essential for maintaining the constitutional separation of powers and ensuring administrative accountability. The doctrinal framework—encompassing finality, standing, ripeness, standards of review, and deference—creates a complex but coherent system for reviewing agency decisions. The overruling of Chevron in Loper Bright represents a pivotal shift in administrative law, restoring courts to a more active role in interpreting federal statutes.