House of Lords
Introduction
The House of Lords is the upper chamber of the United Kingdom Parliament. It serves primarily as a revising and scrutinising body, complementing the elected House of Commons. Unlike most second chambers in democratic systems, the House of Lords is largely appointed rather than elected, a feature that has generated persistent debate about its legitimacy and composition. Its membership includes life peers, hereditary peers, and Lords Spiritual. The Lords plays a vital role in the legislative process, offering expert scrutiny and providing a check on the executive, but its powers are ultimately limited by the primacy of the House of Commons.
Composition
The House of Lords is the second largest legislative chamber in the world after the National People’s Congress of China. Its membership consists of three categories. Life peers are appointed under the Life Peerages Act 1958 and hold their titles for life; they constitute the great majority of the active membership and include former politicians, judges, civil servants, business leaders, academics, and representatives of the arts and charitable sectors. Hereditary peers were reduced to 92 following the House of Lords Act 1999, which removed the automatic right of all hereditary peers to sit in the House. These remaining 92 are elected internally by the hereditary peerage. Lords Spiritual comprise the Archbishops of Canterbury and York, the Bishops of London, Durham, and Winchester, and 21 other senior diocesan bishops of the Church of England. The Appointments Commission recommends non-party-political peers and vets nominations for propriety. The size of the House has grown significantly, reaching over 800 members, prompting concerns about efficiency and legitimacy.
The Appellate Function and the Constitutional Reform Act 2005
Historically, the House of Lords served as the highest court of appeal for the United Kingdom, exercising this function through the Appellate Committee composed of Lords of Appeal in Ordinary (the Law Lords). This arrangement fused legislative and judicial authority, violating the principle of separation of powers. The Constitutional Reform Act 2005 abolished the appellate jurisdiction of the House of Lords, transferring it to the new Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, which began operating in October 2009. The Act also modified the office of Lord Chancellor, removing that office’s role as head of the judiciary and speaker of the House of Lords. The twelve Lords of Appeal in Ordinary became the first Justices of the Supreme Court and were barred from sitting or voting in the House of Lords. This reform significantly enhanced the institutional independence of the judiciary and aligned the UK more closely with international norms of judicial separation.
Legislative Scrutiny
The House of Lords performs three principal legislative functions. Revision involves improving the quality of legislation through detailed amendment, often on matters the Commons has not had time to consider fully. The Lords’ less partisan character and expert membership—including former senior judges, diplomats, and civil servants—enable it to identify technical defects and unintended consequences in bills. Delaying legislation is the Lords’ constitutional power, limited by the Parliament Acts 1911 and 1949. The Lords cannot delay money bills beyond one month, and other public bills can be forced through without Lords consent if passed by the Commons in two successive sessions with at least one year between Second Reading and final passage. The Parliament Act 1949 reduced the delaying power from three sessions to two. The Acts have been used only rarely, most notably to enact the Parliament Act 1949 itself, the War Crimes Act 1991, and the Hunting Act 2004. Scrutiny committees in the Lords, including the Constitution Committee, the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, and the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, provide expert oversight of constitutional standards and delegated legislation.
Reform Proposals
The composition and role of the House of Lords have been subjects of reform debate for over a century. The Parliament Act 1911 preamble declared the intention to replace the House with “a Second Chamber constituted on a popular instead of hereditary basis,” but this has never been fulfilled. The House of Lords Act 1999 removed most hereditary peers as a first stage, with further reform promised. The Wakeham Commission (2000) proposed a mixed appointed and elected chamber, but no consensus emerged. Under the Labour government (1997–2010), multiple votes were held on seven options for composition, none commanding majority support. The Coalition government (2010–2015) proposed a wholly or largely elected second chamber, but the House of Commons rejected time limits for the bill’s passage, effectively killing the reform. Proposals have included a fully elected senate, a wholly appointed chamber, a hybrid model, and outright abolition. The Strathclyde Review (2015) examined the Lords’ role in blocking statutory instruments after the Lords defeated the Tax Credits Regulations, recommending that the Lords’ veto over statutory instruments be removed. The Burns Committee (2017) recommended reducing the size of the Lords. No government has yet implemented comprehensive reform, and the House remains the world’s largest second chamber, composed largely by appointment.
The Salisbury Convention
The Salisbury-Addison Convention (commonly the Salisbury Convention) provides that the House of Lords will not oppose the second reading of any government bill that implements a manifesto commitment. The convention, developed in 1945 following the Labour landslide, ensures that the Lords does not frustrate the legislative programme of an elected government on matters that have been put to the electorate. It has been extended to cover coalition and single-party governments and applies to bills rather than specific provisions. The convention does not prevent the Lords from tabling amendments to manifesto bills, but it limits their ability to reject them outright. The convention reflects the constitutional subordination of the appointed chamber to the elected chamber, consistent with democratic principle.
Conclusion
The House of Lords occupies an unusual position in comparative constitutional terms: a largely appointed second chamber with limited legislative power but significant influence on the quality and scrutiny of legislation. Its expert membership, less partisan character, and willingness to hold the government to account provide a valuable corrective to the dominance of the executive in the House of Commons. Yet questions of legitimacy, size, and composition persist. The Lords’ role as a revising chamber is widely valued, but its undemocratic basis sits uneasily with modern constitutional norms. Reform remains politically challenging, and the House continues to operate on the basis of inherited tradition, incremental change, and self-restraint, pending a political consensus on its future that has proven elusive for over a century.