French Legal Interpretation Methods

The Exegetical School

The exegetical method was the dominant approach to statutory interpretation in nineteenth-century France. The École de l’Exégèse, associated with jurists such as Charles Demolombe and Jean-Charles F. Savigny, held that the judge’s role was to discover and apply the will of the legislator as expressed in the text of the statute. The interpreter was not to create law but to extract the legislator’s intention through grammatical and logical analysis.

The exegetical school reflected the post-Revolutionary confidence in codification. The Code civil of 1804 was regarded as a complete and coherent system requiring no supplementation by judicial creativity. Article 5 of the Code prohibited judges from pronouncing by way of general rulemaking (arrêt de règlement), reinforcing the subordinate role of the judiciary.

The Cour de cassation in the nineteenth century applied the exegetical method rigorously. In Cass. civ., 2 mars 1835, the court refused to extend the application of a statutory provision to a situation not expressly covered by its text, holding that the judge could not supply omissions in the law. This strict textualism gradually yielded to more flexible approaches as the limits of codification became apparent.

Arrêt de Règlement Prohibition

The prohibition of arrêts de règlement is a fundamental principle of French public law. Article 5 of the Code civil provides: “Judges are prohibited from pronouncing by way of general and regulatory provisions on the cases submitted to them.” The prohibition reflects the separation of powers: the legislature makes general rules, the judge applies them to specific cases.

The prohibition does not prevent the development of jurisprudence constante (settled case law), where a consistent line of judicial decisions creates a de facto rule. The Cour de cassation in Cass. ass. plén., 18 juin 1999 (the Perruche case) confirmed that while a single judgment cannot create a binding precedent, a consistent series of judgments may establish a rule that lower courts are expected to follow.

The Conseil d’État applies the same principle in administrative law, but the influence of its decisions is if anything greater. Because administrative law is largely uncodified, the Conseil d’État’s jurisprudence has the character of quasi-legislation. In Arrêt Blanco (1873), the Tribunal des Conflits established the autonomy of administrative law, and subsequent decisions of the Conseil d’État have developed the principles of liability, procedure, and judicial review in the absence of explicit statutory provisions.

Teleological Interpretation

Teleological interpretation, which seeks to give effect to the purpose and objectives of the law, has become increasingly important in French judicial reasoning. The Cour de cassation and the Conseil d’État routinely refer to the finalité (purpose) of a statute in interpreting ambiguous provisions.

The Conseil constitutionnel has played a significant role in promoting teleological interpretation. In Décision n° 71-44 DC (1971) on freedom of association, the Council interpreted constitutional provisions in light of their underlying purpose, reading the principes fondamentaux reconnus par les lois de la République as implicit constitutional norms. This teleological approach has been extended in subsequent decisions, most notably in Décision n° 2013-669 DC (2013) on the principle of fraternity.

The influence of European Union law has reinforced teleological interpretation in France. The Cour de cassation in Cassis de Dijon (CJEU C-120/78, implemented by French courts) applied the EU principle of effet utile (useful effect) to require national courts to interpret national law in conformity with EU directives, even where the national text is clear. The Conseil d’État has similarly adopted teleological methods in applying the European Convention on Human Rights.

Attendu Style and Motivation

French judicial decisions are written in a distinctive attendu style. The Cour de cassation formulates its judgments as a series of attendu que (whereas) clauses, each presenting a proposition of law, followed by a single par ces motifs (for these reasons) paragraph that states the decision and the applicable legal rule.

The attendu style is notably concise and abstract. French judgments do not discuss the facts in detail, do not cite academic commentary or foreign decisions, and do not explain the policy reasons for the decision. The judgment states the legal rule without revealing the reasoning processes of the judges.

This style has been criticised for obscuring the true grounds of decision. Some French legal scholars, including the late Dean Jean Carbonnier, argued that the attendu style conceals the interpretive choices that judges inevitably make. In response, some decisions of the Cour de cassation have become more discursive, particularly in cases involving fundamental rights. The Cour de cassation’s rapports annuels now include extended discussions of interpretive methodology.

Motivation of Judgments

The requirement for motivation (reasoning) of judgments is a constitutional principle in French law. Article 455 of the Code de procédure civile requires every judgment to state the reasons on which it is based. The requirement applies equally to administrative and criminal judgments.

The Cour de cassation reviews the motivation of lower court judgments rigorously. Inadequate motivation is one of the most common grounds for cassation. In Cass. civ. 1re, 12 mai 2021, the court quashed a judgment that merely summarised the parties’ arguments without explaining why the court preferred one version of the facts over another, holding that the motivation must be sufficient to enable the parties to understand the basis of the decision and the Cour de cassation to exercise its supervisory role.

The Conseil d’État applies a similar standard. In CE, 28 décembre 2017, Société Air France, the Council annulled an administrative decision for failing to explain why the authority had departed from its previous practice, holding that the motivation must address the consistency of the decision with previous decisions in analogous cases.

Interpretation by the Cour de Cassation

The Cour de cassation exercises its interpretive function through the control of lower court decisions. The Court does not re-examine the facts but reviews the legal reasoning of the lower court. If the Court finds that the lower court has misapplied the law, it quashes (casse) the decision and remits the case to a court of the same level, which is not bound by the Cour de cassation’s interpretation.

However, after the second appeal (pourvoi en cassation), the case is heard by the Assemblée plénière of the Cour de cassation, whose decision binds the lower court on the point of law (Cass. ass. plén., 20 décembre 2019). This mechanism ensures the uniform interpretation of law while preserving the formal prohibition on arrêts de règlement.

The Cour de cassation also issues arrêts de principe, which are decisions that establish a new interpretation of the law and are intended to guide lower courts. In Cass. ass. plén., 17 mai 2018 (the Dame X. case on gestational surrogacy), the Court issued a landmark interpretation of Article 16-7 of the Code civil, establishing the principle that foreign birth certificates of children born through surrogacy must be transcribed into French civil status registers.

Interpretation by the Conseil d’État

The Conseil d’État exercises its interpretive role primarily through the recours pour excès de pouvoir (appeal for excess of power), which permits any person with standing to challenge the legality of administrative acts. In deciding such appeals, the Conseil d’État interprets both statutory provisions and the principes généraux du droit (general principles of law) that govern administrative action.

The Conseil d’État’s interpretive methodology is more openly purposive than that of the Cour de cassation. In CE, 3 octobre 2016, Société Bouygues Telecom, the Council interpreted a telecommunications regulation in light of its economic objectives rather than its literal text, holding that the regulation’s purpose of promoting competition justified a broader reading than the text alone would support.

The Conseil d’État also exercises an interpretive function through its avis (advisory opinions) on government legislation. While the avis are not binding, they carry substantial authority and are regularly cited by the Conseil d’État in its judicial decisions.

Conclusion

French legal interpretation methods have evolved from the strict textualism of the exegetical school to a more purposive and contextual approach. The prohibition on arrêts de règlement has not prevented the development of consistent case law by the Cour de cassation and the Conseil d’État. The distinctive attendu style and the rigorous requirement for motivation continue to characterise French judicial reasoning, while European influences have promoted teleological interpretation and the consideration of fundamental rights.