Chinese Military Courts and Justice

Structure of Chinese Military Courts

Chinese military courts (junshi fayuan, 军事法院) constitute a separate judicial hierarchy within the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), organised in three tiers. The Military Court of the People’s Liberation Army (Zhongguo Renmin Jiefangjun Junshi Fayuan) sits at the apex, equivalent in rank to the Higher People’s Courts in the civilian system. Below it, theatre command military courts (zhanqu junshi fayuan) serve each of the five theatre commands — Eastern, Southern, Western, Northern, and Central — together with a separate court for the PLA Rocket Force. At the base level, corps-level military courts (jituanjun junshi fayuan) and equivalent courts serve army groups and comparable PLA organisational units.

Military courts exercise jurisdiction primarily over criminal offences committed by active-duty military personnel. The court system operates under the Organic Law of the People’s Courts, which recognises military courts as specialised people’s courts (Article 15), and the Organic Law of the Military Courts, which was substantially revised in 2018 to align military judicial organisation with the PLA’s command structure reforms.

Military Procuratorates

The military procuratorate system mirrors the military court hierarchy. The PLA Military Procuratorate (Jiefangjun Junshi Jianchayuan) is the highest prosecutorial organ within the military, functioning under the leadership of the Supreme People’s Procuratorate (SPP). Theatre-level and corps-level military procuratorates handle criminal investigation supervision, prosecution, and oversight of military detention.

Military procurators exercise the same functions as civilian procurators — approving arrests, conducting investigations, initiating prosecutions, and supervising enforcement — but within the military disciplinary framework. The relationship between military procuratorates and the PLA’s own disciplinary inspection system (jilü jiancha) overlaps and creates jurisdictional questions. The disciplinary inspection system, administered by the PLA’s Commission for Discipline Inspection, investigates corruption and Party discipline violations among PLA members, while the military procuratorate handles criminal offences.

Jurisdiction over Service Personnel

Military court jurisdiction extends to active-duty soldiers, officers, and civilian personnel of the PLA and the People’s Armed Police Force (PAP) who commit offences defined in the Criminal Code. The Criminal Law contains a specific chapter (Chapter X, Articles 420-451) on “Crimes of Military Personnel Dereliction of Duty” (junren weifan zhiwu zui), covering offences including insubordination, desertion, absence without leave, cowardice,擅自脱离部队, abuse of authority, and unauthorised disclosure of military secrets.

Military courts also exercise jurisdiction over civilians who commit offences defined under military criminal law where the offence is committed within military installations or during military operations. The 2018 reforms limited the category of civilians subject to military jurisdiction, transferring most civilian offences to ordinary courts and restricting military jurisdiction to cases directly affecting military order and discipline.

Court-Martial Procedure

The procedure in Chinese military courts is governed by the Criminal Procedure Law, which applies to military proceedings with modifications specified in military procedural regulations. The SPP and the PLA Military Procuratorate jointly issue guidance on the application of criminal procedure in the military context.

The military court system operates a three-instance structure similar to the civilian system, though appeals from corps-level military courts go to the theatre command courts, and appeals from theatre command courts go to the PLA Military Court. The PLA Military Court’s judgments are subject to review by the Supreme People’s Court, though in practice the SPC accords substantial deference to military judicial decisions.

Defence counsel in military proceedings face significant constraints. Civilian defence lawyers may participate but require security clearance and face Practical difficulties accessing clients and evidence. The PLA’s internal defence system allows military legal officers (guwen lüshi) to represent defendants, but these officers are PLA members subject to military command, raising questions about the independence of legal representation.

Economic Crimes and Corruption

Economic crimes committed by military personnel — particularly embezzlement of military funds, procurement fraud, and bribery — have become an increasing focus of military courts. The PLA’s anti-corruption campaign, initiated under Xi Jinping from 2012, resulted in the investigation and prosecution of senior military figures including General Guo Boxiong (former Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission, convicted 2016, life imprisonment) and General Xu Caihou (former Vice-Chairman, died before trial).

The military courts’ handling of high-profile corruption cases has been criticised for lack of transparency. Proceedings are typically held in camera, judgments are not published, and the verdict is announced as a fait accompli. The conviction of General Fang Fenghui (former Chief of the Joint Staff Department, sentenced to life imprisonment in 2019) followed a closed military trial, consistent with the pattern of secret proceedings in senior officer cases.

Military-Civilian Cases Reform (2010)

The 2010 reform of military-civilian cases (jundijian zheng’an gaige) addressed the jurisdictional overlap between military and civilian courts in cases where military personnel commit offences against civilians or where civilians commit offences on military installations. Prior to the reform, military courts exercised broad jurisdiction over civilians in cases involving military interests, creating concerns about civilian access to justice and due process.

The reform transferred primary jurisdiction over civilian defendants to ordinary people’s courts, with military courts retaining jurisdiction only where the civilian defendant is a military employee or where the offence directly affects military secrets or combat readiness. The reform also established a coordination mechanism between military and civilian courts for cases involving both military and civilian defendants, requiring consultation on jurisdiction allocation.

In civil disputes involving military parties (jundijian minshi jiufen), the reform allowed civilian courts to hear cases against military entities for contractual and tort claims, subject to the protection of military secrets. The Supreme People’s Court and the PLA Military Court jointly issued guidance in 2012 on the handling of military-civilian disputes, providing procedural rules for case transfer, evidence protection, and the application of military immunity.

The 2018 Reforms

The 2018 revision of the Organic Law of the Military Courts implemented structural changes responding to the PLA’s 2015-2016 command structure reform, which replaced the seven military regions with five theatre commands. The military court hierarchy was reorganised to align with the theatre command system, and specialised military courts were established for the PLA Rocket Force and the Strategic Support Force.

The 2018 reforms also addressed the relationship between military justice and civilian judicial oversight. The SPC’s authority to supervise military courts was formally clarified, though in practice the SPC exercises limited supervisory power over military judgments. The reforms established a mechanism for the SPC to designate civilian courts to hear appeals from military courts in cases involving civilian parties, creating a limited appellate bridge between the military and civilian judicial systems.

Conclusions

Chinese military justice operates as a parallel judicial system insulated from civilian oversight and distinguished by limited procedural transparency, constraints on defence rights, and the subordination of judicial decision-making to military command. The 2010 reform of military-civilian cases partially addressed jurisdictional overlap, and the 2018 reforms aligned military court structure with PLA command reforms. However, the core features of military justice — closed proceedings, controlled defence access, and integration with military discipline — remain largely unreformed.