China and International Human Rights

Treaty Engagement

China’s relationship with the international human rights treaty system is characterised by selective engagement. China signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) on 5 October 1998 but has not ratified it. The reasons for non-ratification are debated but are generally understood to include concerns about compatibility between ICCPR obligations — particularly free expression, assembly, and association — and domestic legal and political structures. China has stated its intention to ratify the ICCPR “when conditions are ripe,” a formulation it has used consistently since 1998 without specifying what conditions must be satisfied.

China ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) on 27 March 2001, subject to a reservation on Article 8(1)(a) (the right to strike), which China stated must be implemented in accordance with its domestic laws and regulations. China submitted its initial ICESCR report in 2004 and has since submitted periodic reports through the UN treaty body process. The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has issued concluding observations noting concerns about labour rights, trade union independence, forced labour in Xinjiang, and the gap between legislative commitments and implementation.

China has ratified seven of the nine core international human rights treaties, including the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1981), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1980), the Convention against Torture (1988), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1992), and the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2008). China has not ratified the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families.

Human Rights White Papers

Since 1991, China has published regular white papers on human rights (renquan baipishu) that present the Chinese government’s official position on human rights achievements, development-oriented rights, and the principle of “putting people first.” The white papers frame human rights in terms of economic and social development rather than civil and political liberties, advocating a “right to development” as the foundational human right.

The Information Office of the State Council publishes comprehensive white papers every two to five years. The 2024 white paper, Progress in Human Rights in China, emphasised poverty alleviation (lifting 100 million people out of poverty by 2021), health rights during COVID-19, and the rights of ethnic minorities. The white papers reject external criticism as interference in China’s internal affairs and assert that China follows a “path of human rights development with Chinese characteristics.”

Tibet and Xinjiang at the United Nations

Tibet and Xinjiang have been persistent subjects of UN human rights scrutiny. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights published a report in August 2022 on human rights concerns in Xinjiang, alleging that serious human rights violations may constitute international crimes. China rejected the report as “a farce built on lies and disinformation” based on “false information” from “extremist forces.”

Regarding Tibet, China has engaged with the UN human rights mechanisms while maintaining its position that Tibet is an integral part of China. The Chinese government reports significant improvements in living standards, education, and infrastructure in Tibet and rejects characterisations of religious or cultural suppression as “interference in China’s internal affairs.”

The Universal Periodic Review (UPR) process has provided a forum for sustained international engagement with China’s human rights record. China submitted to its first UPR review in 2009, its second in 2013, its third in 2018, and its fourth in 2024. During the 2024 review, 175 states made recommendations, including calls for China to ratify the ICCPR to end arbitrary detention, to cease human rights violations in Xinjiang, to protect the rights of ethnic minorities, to release human rights lawyers and activists, and to allow greater civil society space. China accepted 108 recommendations, took note of 131, and rejected 40.

Belt and Road and Human Rights

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has raised significant human rights questions. Chinese overseas infrastructure financing and construction projects operate primarily through bilateral agreements with host states and are governed by Chinese law and contractual terms rather than multilateral human rights frameworks. Critics argue that the BRI undermines human rights by supporting authoritarian governments, failing to conduct adequate environmental and social impact assessments, employing Chinese workers over local labour, and contributing to debt distress that compresses host state fiscal space for social spending.

China has responded by developing voluntary standards for BRI projects, including the Green Investment Principles and guidance on social responsibility. The Chinese government argues that the BRI promotes the right to development by creating economic opportunities and improving infrastructure in developing countries, and that human rights conditionalities imposed by Western donors constitute neocolonial interference.

Domestic Human Rights Framework

China’s domestic human rights protection is grounded in Chapter II of the 1982 Constitution, which enumerates fundamental rights and duties of citizens, and in a growing body of legislation including the Tort Liability Law (2009, now Civil Code Book VII), the Labour Contract Law (2007), and the personal information protection laws (2021). The National Human Rights Action Plan (Guojia Renquan Xingdong Jihua), first issued in 2009 and updated every three to five years, sets government policy targets for human rights implementation.

The relationship between international human rights law and Chinese domestic law is governed by the monist-dualist hybrid that characterises Chinese treaty practice. Human rights treaties ratified by China take effect domestically only when implemented through domestic legislation. Courts rarely cite international human rights treaties directly, though the Supreme People’s Court has issued guidance encouraging reference to international norms in certain areas, such as juvenile justice and anti-torture safeguards.

Conclusion

China’s approach to international human rights is defined by a persistent tension between its engagement with multilateral mechanisms — treaty ratification, periodic reporting, the UPR process, and participation in the UN Human Rights Council — and its resistance to external scrutiny, particularly regarding Tibet and Xinjiang. The human rights white papers articulate a development-oriented counter-narrative to the civil and political rights framework emphasised by Western states. The BRI adds a transnational dimension, raising questions about China’s human rights footprint beyond its borders. The non-ratification of the ICCPR remains the most salient indicator of the limits of China’s human rights treaty engagement.